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BUYER'S MARKET n (1926): a market in which goods are plentiful, buyers have a wide range of choice, and prices tend to be low
compare SELLER'S MARKET.
SELLER'S MARKET n (1932): a market in which goods are scarce,
buyers have a limited range of choice, and prices are high - compare BUYER'S MARKET.
MERRIAM WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 10th ed., 1993.
LEADERSHIP: action that focuses resources to create new
opportunities.
-

DAVID CAMPBELL, IF I'M IN CHARGE
HERE WHY IS EVERYBODY LAUGH-

ING? 44
I.

(1980).

INTRODUCTION

A current complaint is that the practice of law "isn't as much
fun as it used to be." Perhaps the primary reason the practice of
law was so much fun in the 1960s and most of the 1970s was that
most lawyers had available to them more work than they could
do.' The country had too few lawyers to facilitate the legal and
business events that clients needed to occur in an expanding economy. The existing lawyer base was therefore able to sell its services in a "seller's market".
Today lawyers practice in a 'buyer's market". That means
lawyers and most of the services they offer are plentiful, buyers
have a wide range of choice, and prices should be low. As the market for legal services corrects itself, law firms that are creative,
innovative,2 and possess good leadership will prosper in comparison with other firms. With stellar leadership3 some law firms
1. "Competitive markets are not much fun for sellers; the effect of
competition is to transform producer surplus into consumer surplus." Richard A.
Posner, The Deprofessionalizationof Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 1921, 1922 (1993) (continuing, Posner notes that when lawyers speak of
a decline in ethics, they are speaking only of one aspect of legal ethics; the aspect
they perceive is primarily the decline in a sense of obligation to courts and nonclients by lawyers, caused in part at least by the enhanced sense of obligation to
clients that a competitive market encourages).
2. In the firm context, Harry Nystr6m defines innovation as "radical,
discontinuous change" and creativity as "the ability to devise and successfully
implement such change". HARRY NYSTROM, CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 1
(1979).
3. David Campbell lists seven tasks of leadership discussed infra: vision,
management, empowerment, politics, feedback, entrepreneurship, and personal
style. DAVID CAMPBELL, MANUAL FOR THE CAMPBELL LEADERSHIP INDEx 4-9
(1991).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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may reinvent themselves 4 and, when their successful innovations
are adopted by others, ultimately reinvent law practice.
Good leaders have three special kinds of knowledge. First,
they know themselves and their own strengths and weaknesses.
This knowledge allows them to take advantage of their strengths
while protecting themselves from their weaknesses. Second, they
know other people, both about human nature in general and about
the particular people with whom they interact. Knowledge of
others' strengths and weaknesses enables leaders to build strong
teams and to develop sound strategies to protect their teams
against the strengths of adversaries while exploiting their adversaries' weaknesses. Third, leaders must know about the environments in which they are expected to lead. Though I view selfawareness and knowledge of others to be distinguishing characteristics of good lawyers, 5 the first two kinds of knowledge are not
the focus of this article. Its purpose is to provide information
about the current environment for law firm leadership, to examine
how that environment came about, and to suggest responsive
leadership initiatives and contexts for the reinvention of law
practice.
I will examine how the legal market and legal profession have
changed as they have transitioned from a buyer's to a seller's market and back over the last forty years. The dominant cultural
change in the seller's market was the advent of the billable hour,
followed by the "tyranny of the time sheet" during the transition
back to a buyer's market. If we trace the history of the rise and
fall of the seller's market and understand the causes of the current buyer's market, we gain insights into how lawyers have
responded, and might best respond, to past, current and projected
environments.
II.

LAwYERS' LIVEs AND LEGAL FEES BEFORE

1960: THE NATURE

OF THE BUYER'S MARKET

Those who began practice during the Depression and
throughout the decade following World War II tell the rest of us
that law practice was much different then. Most people tended to
4. Reinvention is a current management and organizational development
concept. See the discussion and examples in Tracy Goss et al., The Reinvention
Roller Coaster:Risking the Presentfor a Powerful Future, HARv. Bus. REV. Nov.Dec. 1993, at 97.
5. F. Leary Davis, The Elements of Lawyer Competence: Their Nature,
Acquisition and Utilization (forthcoming 1994).
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go to law school not because they expected to make a lot of money
but because other aspects of lawyers' lifestyles were pleasing to
them: interesting and important work, opportunities for leadership roles, and the ability to make a difference in the lives and
institutions of other people.
However, at that time, perhaps a third of graduating law students did not practice law.6 There being few if any MBA programs
available to them, some had pursued legal educations as preparation for business. In their initial years in industry they found at
their sides law school classmates who had wanted to practice law.
Many of the leaders of the Bar today were unable to find positions
in law practice following graduation from law school. They
worked in government or business, as insurance adjusters and
elsewhere, until they were able to find law firm work or save
enough money to open their own practices. Other classmates
never entered practice.
When they began practice in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s, lawyers
normally charged clients one of four types of fees: a FIXED FEE bar-

gained for in advance, a

CONTINGENCY FEE,

a

PERCENTAGE FEE

based upon a percentage of dollars involved in a transaction (e.g.,
one percent of the amount involved in a real estate closing) or a
RETROSPECTIVE FEE

(one set at the conclusion of a matter based

upon the amount of work done and what the lawyer had accomplished). Each of these methods of billing was value-based. Since
an ample number of lawyers was available to meet client needs,
before selecting their lawyers clients were able to determine the
value of services in advance through bargaining, 7 except in the
case of the retrospective fee. Even when lawyers set retrospective
fees, because they were in a buyer's market, they found their fiduciary duties to clients reinforced by their desire to maintain good
relationships with those clients. Clients were scarce, and lawyers
wanted to retain their loyalty.
Client relationships were also preserved, and lawyers protected, by minimum fee schedules, the first of which had appeared
6. The estimate of one third is one that recurs in conversations with senior
lawyers. They think almost all of their classmates entered law school wanting to
practice law.
7. Of course, many clients lacked equal bargaining power with their lawyers.
It was inefficient for them to incur information and transaction costs in
determining available market prices; interestingly, they were aided somewhat in
this effort by the existence of minimum fee schedules, which were subsequently
abolished on antitrust grounds. See infra p. 161.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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in Massachusetts in 1790.8 Indeed, at all levels of the profession,
from institutional representation of major corporations by larger
firms to the varied representations of citizens by the community
lawyer, the economic welfare of lawyers was grounded in their
establishment of constant relationships with clients. But things
began to change in the 1960s.
III.

THE SELLER'S MARKET AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYER
POPULATION AND THE VALUE OF LEGAL SERVICES

Clients began to need more and more services, and more and
more people went to law school to help meet those clients' legal
needs. We can best visualize the evolving market for legal services
1:

FIG.
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by looking at two statistics: gross national product divided by
lawyer population and FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate)
employment compared to lawyer population. Figure 1 helps us
visualize the first statistic and Figure 2 the second. As Figure 1
shows, in the buyer's market preceding the 1960s, the number of
8. William G. Ross, The Ethics ofHourly Billing By Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 1 (1991).
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lawyers compared to gross national product remained relatively
constant, at around $7,000,000 of GNP per lawyer in constant
1987 dollars. As the economy began to expand in the 1960s, much
more legal work became available. More people began going to
law school to help meet the demand for those services, but the profession kept losing ground to the demand curve until around 1970.
As still more people began to aspire to help meet the demand for
legal services, law schools uniformly increased enrollments and
new law schools opened to meet the demand (see Table I for data
representative of what was happening nationally in legal education). As we entered the 1980s lawyer population and GNP
appeared to have begun reestablishing a relationship similar to
but somewhat below that of the 1950s buyer's market, at around
$6,500,000 of GNP per lawyer.
TABLE

I.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW AND NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL
ENROLLMENTS

School

1958

1968

1978

1988

Duke
N.C. Central
UNC
Wake Forest
Campbell

151
23
253
135
-

313
85
499
185
-

533
202
665
475
270

587
244
678
464
298

TOTALS

562

1,082

2,145

2,271

41,399

59,498

116,150

120,694

All schools in the
United States

Source: A Review of Legal Education in the United States, 1968, 1978, and 1988,
and 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 266 (1958)

A.

"FIRE"Employment and the Need for Lawyers

Perhaps the best indicator of the need for lawyers is the
number of people employed in the finance, insurance and real
estate industries (FIRE employment). When the economy is
robust, banks and insurance companies lend money, businesses
and individuals insure against more risks, and real estate transactions are a part of economic growth. As Figure 2 demonstrates,
the growth in the number of lawyers parallels the growth in FIRE
employment, the number of lawyers appearing to be a variable
dependent upon FIRE employment. Over the last 40 years, an
average of 9.43 FIRE employees has been supplying work to each

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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FIG. 2: EMPLOYMENT IN FINANCE, INSURANCE AND REAL ESTATE
(FIRE) COMPARED WITH TOTAL LAWYER POPULATION: 1950-1990
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Source: Campbell University ISPOL.SED.

lawyer in the United States.9 It appears that when each lawyer
has more than 9.5 of these employees (or the purchasers of legal
services they represent) competing to purchase the lawyer's services in the national economy, lawyers are in a seller's market.
However, when the competition among clients decreases to
around nine FIRE employees per lawyer, a buyer's market
emerges. Figure 1 and Figure 2 are consistent in their depiction of
a transition into and back out of a seller's market from the 1960s
to the 1980s. The correlation becomes even more dramatic in Figure 3, where the curve in Figure 1 is compared to a curve representing the ratio of Fire employment per lawyer.
B.

Law School Enrollments and Lawyer population
Figure 4 shows the increase of total LL.B. and J.D. law school
enrollments since 1946, and Figure 5 shows the actual and projected impact of those enrollments on the national lawyer-population ratio through 2030. In 1950 there were 741 persons per
lawyer in the United States; in 1992 there were only 318. Yet
because employment was also growing in other areas of the econ9. See infra Appendix A.
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FIG. 3: MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF GNP PER LAWYER COMPARED
WITH FIRE EMPLOYMENT PER LAWYER: 1946-1991
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omy, the perceived "lawyer glut" remained in fact a lawyer
shortage throughout most of the 1970s. It appears that lawyerpopulation ratios are not particularly good indicators of the need
for lawyers in the United States. What is important is the extent
to which persons need legal assistance in the making and implementing of their plans. 10 The number and complexity of those
plans are products primarily of economic activities that are measured in large part by GNP and FIRE employment.
The Value Curve
As more legal work became available, more people decided to
go to law school. As more lawyers became available, the value of
their services declined. This phenomenon is demonstrated by Bill
Cobb's "value curve"," (see Figure 6) the characteristics of which
C.

10. A basic premise of this article is that the work of lawyers can best be
analyzed in the context of law practice as the making and implementing of plans.
11. William C. Cobb, The Value Curve and the Folly of Billing-RatePricing,in
BEYOND THE BILLABLE

HouR: AN

ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS

17, 17 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989). The value curve is further discussed in WINWIN BILLING STRATEGIES 35-48 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1992) and in ROBERT J.
ARNDT, MANAGING FOR PROFIT 56-62 (1991).
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FIG. 4: TOTAL J.D. LAW SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: 1946-1991
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Sources: A Review of Legal Education and the Office of the Consultant on Legal
Education to the ABA.

are intensified in a buyer's market. Cobb says that as more work
of a particular kind is available for lawyers to do, many lawyers
learn to do that kind of work. Because of the large number of competitors in the market, these services become more price-sensitive.
Clients feel that any good lawyer can perform the service, and
they tend to shop for the best price. Cobb calls these services
"Commodity" services and estimates that they constitute 60% of
all available legal work. An example of this type of work, and of
the dynamics surrounding its decreasing value over time, can be
seen in residential real estate closings, the fees for which are very
price sensitive.
Cobb refers to work that is more important to the client, but
still somewhat routine, as "Brand Name" services. Cobb estimates they constitute 20% of the market. In this instance the client's shopping culminates in a lawyer or firm being hired because
of an institutional reputation for doing a particular kind of work.
Because of the work's importance it has more value to the client,
but it is still price sensitive. Real estate development and related
compliance work, as compared to the residential real estate closing, is an example of "Brand Name" work.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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FIG.

5: AcTuAL AND PROJECTED POPULATION-LAWYER RATIOS:
1950-2030
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Cobb refers to clients' high impact and high risk work as
"Experiential" services. Because of their importance the client is
no longer looking for a brand name firm to handle the work, but
for the best possible lawyer, based on that lawyer's experience in
handling the particular type of case. An example might be the
rezoning application that if unsuccessful will preclude the important real estate development. This work, constituting about 16%
of available services in Cobb's model, is much less price sensitive.
Finally, at the top of the value curve is "Unique" or "Bet Your
Company" work. An example might be a business workout or
reorganization that, if unsuccessful, will put the client out of business. For this work, which Cobb believes constitutes about 4% of
the legal work available, price is not a concern.
Obviously, lawyers who charge a flat hourly rate for all work
that corresponds to a point on the value curve at the intersection
of commodity and brand name work will overprice some and
underprice other of their services. Assuming they possess typical
competence, their flat hourly rates will exceed the value of commodity work and be less than the value of brand name work.
Lawyers who do not develop strategies for delegating work to
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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FIG. 6: VALUE CURVE AND COMPETITIVE POSITION PROFILE
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X 4X
5X
15X
Volume of Legal Work Available in the Market
Source: Cobb, supra note 11, at 18.
lower cost providers or for using substantive systems will lose

commodity work to other lawyers or nonlawyers who charge less
for the service. Lawyers who do not charge more for time
expended doing experiential and unique work, though they may
gain market share because of lower prices, may suffer financially
if they fail to recover the research and other information costs that
are essential in preparing one to deliver rare, differentiated services. Despite these facts we find ourselves in a lawyering culture
in which lawyers tend to value each of their hours and services
identically, even though their clients obviously do not value their
needs for services that way. It is important to define this culture
and understand how it arose during the 1970s and '80s.
IV.

FLUCTUATIONS IN THE PROFESSION DURING THE SELLER'S

MARKET: COST-BASED BILLING SYSTEMS

A.

Cost Accounting and the Advent of the Billable Hour

We have said that prior to 1960 lawyers normally charged clients one of four types of value-based fees: fixed, contingent, percentage or retrospective. As the 1960s dawned and lawyers
became very busy, they began to adopt tools of business. One of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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these methods was cost accounting. 1 2 By keeping time and comparing time spent with fees charged, firms were able to determine
[1] the differing costs of serving clients in different practice areas
and [2] the relative profitability of the different areas. The theory
was that when firms discovered unprofitable practice areas they
could adopt several strategies: [1] increase fees to make the practice area more profitable, [2] develop methods of producing work
products more efficiently, thereby making the practice area more
profitable without increasing fees for particular products, or [3]
abandon the practice area to lower cost providers.
While firms continued to charge value-based contingent and
percentage fees in practice areas in which the market had established the value of those services, the timekeeping associated with
cost accounting led not to value-based adjustment to fixed fees
and fees set retrospectively, but to their replacement by hourly
rate fees. Several studies had revealed that the net income of lawyers who kept time substantially exceeded that of lawyers who did
not. The time-keeping lawyers were more profitable because they
were aware of time expended when setting retrospective fees and
used their knowledge of time spent on task to increase their efficiency in earning fixed fees. Nevertheless, a new strategy soon
13
became dominant: to sell time to clients.
Hindsight reveals why it was so easy, and so reasonable, for
lawyers to transition to cost-based hourly billing in the '60s and
'70s. First, as to ease, lawyers were transitioning into a seller's
market in which they had a monopoly, and their clients had little
bargaining power. Second, as to reasonableness, business people
had to agree that lawyers' arguments in favor of hourly billing
made good business sense. Lawyers should insure that they paid
their overhead, and they were entitled to a reasonable livelihood.
So it made sense that a lawyer should determine overhead, add
the amount of money the lawyer wanted to make in the coming
year, and divide that sum by the number of hours the lawyer
planned to work. The result equaled the lawyer's hourly rate for
the coming year. This procedure seemed consistent with the tra12. Richard C. Reed, How Did We Get to Where We Are - And What Are We
Going to Do About It?, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HouR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 3, 4 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989); Mary Ann
Altman, A Perspective - From Value Billing to Time Billing and Back to Value
Billing, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HouR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING
METHODS 11, 11 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989).

13. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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dition that a lawyer would make a comfortable living while practicing, but would not become wealthy from practice.
In addition, because most lawyers had more work than they
could do, clients did not have to worry about monitoring their lawyers. Since lawyers were so busy, they could not afford to "chum"
cases to build hours; doing so would prevent them from serving
other needy clients and would be a detriment to the firm. Law
firms did in fact become more efficient in the 1960s and '70s, not
because of cost accounting, but because they had to do so in order
to meet the pent-up demand for legal services.
B.

Billable Hours, NIPP and the Growth of Law Firms

One way lawyers could become more efficient was to employ
persons, such as associates and paralegals, to whom they could
delegate work of limited complexity. Fortuitously, partners could
not only better meet client needs by growing their firms and delegating work, they could also make a profit from the work of their
employees. They could be both capitalists and professionals. Law
practice could become a means not only of making a comfortable
living, but of acquiring wealth. This could be done through leverage, by purchasing the time of nonpartners at wholesale and providing it to clients at retail prices. As professionals, partners
could serve clients personally and make a good living; as capital14
ists they could sell the labor of others and accumulate wealth.
Ultimately, the economics of this practice became best explained
by an equation for determining net income per partner, the NIPP
15
formula:
NIPP (net income = (1+L) x U x BR x R x M per partner)
where
L = Leverage, the ratio of nonpartner timekeepers to partners
U = Utilization, or average hours billed per timekeeper
BR = Billing Rate, the average blended hourly rate charged by the

firm
R
M

= realization rate, the percent of billed hours collected
= Margin, or profit margin, the ratio of net income to gross fees

14. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAwYERS: THE
20-36 (1991) (dealing with the "Golden
Age" of large law finns, the authors demonstrate that the selling of associate's
time was not dependent upon the billable hour).
15. David Maister does a nice job of explaining the formula and its
implications in the emerging buyers' market in David Maister, Profitability:
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAw FIRM

Beating the Downward Trend, JOURNAL

OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTING,

Fall 1984,

at 39.
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Initially, the seller's market of the 1960s and early '70s
seemed to create a win-win situation for lawyers and their clients.
By growing their firms, partners could both better serve their clients and make more money by leveraging the time of associates.
In the late 1960s growth and leverage were particularly advantageous to partners because associate salaries were so modest.
Then, in 1968 the firm of Cravath, Swaine and Moore drastically
upped the going Wall Street salary for new associates by onefourth or better, to $15,000 per year.' 6 If firms were in the business of selling the time and talent of associates, Cravath could differentiate itself by acquiring the best associates, and could acquire
the best associates by paying differentiated salaries. The talent of
those associates would justify higher hourly rates, creating
greater net income per partner. Cravath's competitors quickly followed suit, and the subsequent escalation in associate salaries
became a nationwide 17trend that remained unabated until the
most recent recession.
The growth of large law firms within a growing profession
was a dominant feature of the seller's market, and the growth continued through the 1980s. In 1975 the nation's largest law firm
consisted of 326 lawyers, and the largest 100 firms contained only
7144 lawyers, for an average of seventy-one per firm.' 8 By 1990
the largest firm had 1519 lawyers, and the largest 100 contained a
total of 40,336 lawyers.' 9 The largest eight contained more lawyers (7380) than the largest 100 had in 1975 (7144).20 The 250th
largest firm had 131 lawyers. 2 ' Similar growth patterns were taking place throughout the nation, at all levels of the profession. For
instance, in North Carolina the largest firm had only forty-one
lawyers in 1975, and the state had only fifteen firms of twelve or
more lawyers.2 2 These twelve firms had a total of only 300 law16. Daniel J. Cantor & Joel A. Rose, After the Revolution.. .in Legal Salaries,

17

THE PRAcTIcAL LAWYER

65 (1971).

17. Cravath accelerated the trend again in 1986, increasing first year salaries
to $65,000. For two reactions to that increase, see John F. Walker and J. Joseph
Bainton, Do Salary Wars Harm the Legal Profession?, 72 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1986,
at 50.
18. F. Leary Davis, Largest U. S. Law Firms: 1975 and 1978 - 1993 (copy on
file with author).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. F. Leary Davis, Merging Law Firms and the Interstate Practice of Law in
North Carolina, 34 N. C. STATE BAR Q. 18 (1987).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1

14

Davis: Back to the Future: The Buyer's Market and The Need for Law Firm

1994]

LAW FIRM LEADERSHIP

yers, or about five percent of the state's lawyer population.2 3 By
1992, 2204 of North Carolina's 9667 private practice lawyers, or
twenty-three percent, practiced in offices with twelve or more
lawyers.2 4
C. The Late '70s and Signs of Things to Come: Court Decisions
and State Ethics Codes
Two important U. S. Supreme Court decisions, Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,25 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,26 had surprisingly different impacts on the hourly billing practices of lawyers. The 1975 Goldfarb decision abolished minimum fee
schedules (at least those not the product of state action) on antitrust grounds. This decision probably accelerated the then growing practice of hourly billing. Minimum fee schedules in many
cases provided ceilings as well as floors on the cost of legal services (in the Goldfarb case, thirty-seven lawyers cited the same fee
for a loan closing, none lower and none higher).2 7 In the absence
of the market information minimum fee schedules had supplied to
lawyers and clients, it was easy to justify substituting cost-based
hourly billing for the value-based fixed fees contained in minimum
fee schedules.
Two years later, however, on the ground of freedom of commercial speech Bates invalidated state action that prohibited the
fixed fee advertising of routine legal services. 2 1 This decision
encouraged lawyers to pursue methods of delivering quality work
products in less time for fixed fees. Bates encouraged systematization, specialization, the use of technology and growth of firms
through employment of less expensive non-lawyer personnel to
whom routine work could be delegated.
The commercial free speech protection of Bates has subsequently been extended to substantially all truthful print advertis23. Id.
24. Campbell University ISPOL'SED, 1992 Census of North Carolina
Lawyers by Firm Size and by County (1993) (copy on file at Campbell University
with F. Leary Davis).
25. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
26. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
27. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 775 (1975).
28. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (Regulating lawyer
advertising by the state as sovereign was held to be immune from antitrust
sanction).
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ing2 and to lawyers' solicitation of those expected to need specific
legal services through targeted mailing.3 0 Political free speech
guarantees have been extended to non-coercive in-person solicitation of clients when the lawyer's motivation is political rather
than pecuniary.3 " State ethics codes allow in-person solicitation of
family members and those with whom lawyers have had "prior
professional relationships".3 2 As the legal market matured, firms
of all sizes began devoting more of their budgets to marketing.
Law firm promotional expenditures, exclusive of salaries of inhouse personnel and the value of partner time spent in marketing
activities, have grown to more than one percent of gross firm revenues. 33 Total costs should ultimately approach or exceed the five
percent-plus figure mature professional services industries spend
on marketing.
While court decisions have affected the way lawyers charge
for their services, the practices of courts in setting and approving
lawyers' fees have had an even more profound impact. In the
1970s the "lodestar" method of setting fees was sanctioned by
courts.3 4 A lodestar was created by multiplying typical hourly
rates by the number of hours lawyers worked on cases, and the
lodestar was adjusted upward or downward depending upon other
factors. This method obviously required contemporaneous timekeeping by attorneys. While adjustments upwards were often
allowed in limited practice areas, in others strict hourly billing
became commonly utilized. Hourly rates and time records provided courts with administrative tools that appeared objective and
were easy to use.
D. The Growth of In-house Counsel
The advent of hourly billing undoubtedly contributed to the
growth of in-house counsel. Private firms' utilization of hourly
rates was based on an assumption that all of an individual lawyer's time was of equal value, whether spent handling routine cor29. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
30. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
31. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
32. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 7.3 (as amxnended
1993); N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.4 (as ammended 1989).
33. ALTMAN WEIL PENSA, THE 1991 SURVEY OF LAw FIRM ECONOMICS 1-7
(1991).
34. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
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respondence or analyzing a novel problem to which the lawyer
could apply great expertise. In fact, much legal work for which
hourly rates were charged was not complex, was repetitious, and
could be handled even more expeditiously if systematized and delegated in part to non-lawyers. Such work was very useful for
training new associates, and the cost of training could be passed
on to clients. Corporations quickly realized they could reduce
their transaction costs by acquiring these services in-house rather
35
than purchasing them from law firms on the open market.
The growth of in-house counsel stimulated other changes in
the legal marketplace. The new corporate counsel possessed both
the ability and the motivation to monitor the work of outside counsel, and to bargain over price. Many came to their new corporate
positions from management committees of private law firms, and
they were wise consumers of legal services. They also came at a
time when the profession was beginning its transition back to a
buyer's market.

V.
A.

THE BEGINNING OF THE BUYER'S MARKET

Porter'sModel

For many larger firms the transition back to a buyer's market
was intensified by general counsel taking much of their commodity "cash cow" work in-house. Large firms that had been using
routine legal work to train their new associates found themselves
with excess capacity when they lost that work to in-house counsel.
In order to utilize that capacity firms moved into new practice
areas and expanded their practices geographically. Mergers, the
opening of branch offices, and marketing of legal services, including explicit efforts to encourage clients to switch counsel, all continued to expand. Competitive Shifts in the Emerging Buyer's
Market
In his widely-used model of competition in the marketplace,3 6
Michael Porter listed four factors that determine the extent of
jockeying for position by existing competitors in a market: the
threat of new entrants into the marketplace, the threat of substi35. See, R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA, Nov. 1937, at 386
(explaining the basics of why the growth of in-house counsel was inevitable).
36. Michael E. Porter, How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy, HARv. Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 137; MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY:
TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS
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tute services, the bargaining power of customers, and the bargaining power of suppliers.
i. Threat of new entrants. For the legal profession threats of
new entrants included out-of-town and out-of-state firms interested in establishing branch offices, strategic mergers between
existing firms, the continuing large number of new law graduates,
and the expanded staffs of in-house corporate counsel.
ii. Bargainingpower of clients. In-house counsel were new
entrants competing for commodity and brand-name work. They
were also clients with increased bargaining power. Perhaps the
best indicator of the shift of bargaining power from attorney to
client was the near universal decision of in-house counsel in the
1980s to seek transactional rather than general assistance with
matters requiring outside assistance. This trend was described as
a decision to hire the best lawyer for a particular matter rather
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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than the best firm for general representation. The best lawyer
was not necessarily the most expensive. Assistance was required
for matters falling within all segments of the value curve: commodity, brand name, experiential, and unique. In many instances
the "best lawyer" was the lawyer who could deliver the work product least expensively; in others it was the lawyer who could
deliver the product fastest or best communicate with in-house
counsel. But in each of these situations in-house counsel considered it economically efficient to incur transaction and information
costs in establishing new relationships with outside counsel
rather than continuing to rely on a single firm or a few firms for
outside assistance.3 7
Likewise, small businesses, larger businesses without inhouse counsel, and individuals were finding it advantageous to
shop for lawyers. They had been taken for granted in the seller's
market and were sometimes surprised 38 to receive from their "regular firm" time-based bills following brief telephone calls for information. Lawyers who advertised, solicited, and utilized other
marketing devices found many of these unhappy clients receptive
to the idea of switching lawyers.
iii. Threat of substitute services. The threat of substitute
services had been strengthened by the decisions of lawyers to
abandon less profitable practice areas, such as tax return preparation, residential real estate, and estate planning. Much of this
work was abandoned not to other lawyers but to accountants, title
insurance companies, banks and insurance companies. Paralegals, whose time had been sold by law firms, began to see opportunities to sell their time at closer to retail prices by offering services
to firms that needed paralegal services on a non-routine basis, or
39
directly to clients.
iv. Bargainingpower of suppliers. Finally, there emerged
what appeared to be a counterintuitive result with respect to the
bargaining power of suppliers, to the extent that suppliers of the
37. The bargaining power of in-house counsel, combined with down-sizing of
in-house offices so that general counsel now has less time to seek out the best
lawyer for each matter, have led to a return to the in-house strategy of relying
upon a limited number of firms for outside representation. Larry Smith, Midsize
Strategies, OF COUNSEL, Jan. 17, 1994, at 2.
38. Because they had neither been asked nor forewarned.
39. Paralegals are seeking licensing in several states. For arguments pro and
con, see Stanley B. Balbach and John A. Gose, Two Views: Should the Bar

Endorse Limited Licensing of Paraprofessionals?,PROBATE

AND PROPERTY,

May-

June 1987, at 55.
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time and talent being sold by law firms were law schools and their
new graduates. There appearing to be a lawyer glut, or oversupply of lawyers, one would have assumed that demand would have
adjusted to supply and that beginning associate salaries would
decrease. They did not. Figure 8 shows the reason why. At the
1988 Graylyn Conference sponsored by The North Carolina State
Bar, representatives of 17 of the state's largest firms predicted for
their firms an average annual growth rate of 10.5% for the next
five years.40 That rate matched the general rate of growth of law
firms for the preceding decade. 4 ' When the rates of growth were
matched against the supply of new lawyers passing July bar
examinations, it was discovered that the relative supply of new
law graduates was actually declining rather than increasing.
While in 1975 the 15 North Carolina firms of over 12 lawyers had
to hire only 30 of 440 lawyers passing the 1976 bar examination to
experience 10% growth, in 1986 the 45 firms of that size had to
employ 130 of 410 graduates to experience the same growth. If
firm growth and bar passage rates continued, those 45 firms
would be. expected to hire half of the successful July bar examinees by 1993. In fact, the growth of those 45 firms slowed (though
the growth of other firms was such that by 1992 the total number
of lawyers in firms of 12 or more equaled the 1986 projections for
1993), and over 500 persons passed the July 1993 bar exam.
Large law firm growth halted abruptly in the early 1990s, as Figure 9 illustrates. Despite the decline in the rate of law firm
growth, the salaries of new associates has remained high, 42 so

high that associates are perceived to be only marginally profitable
to the firms employing them.
As law firms have continued to grow, the bargaining power of
their suppliers has remained strong. Many of their suppliers,
such as landlords and vendors of technology, also sell to other
markets, and their bargaining power is affected as much or more
by national and regional economies as by the legal marketplace.
B. Rising Overhead and the Profit Squeeze
Because the bargaining power of their suppliers was great,
law firms saw their overhead continue to rise. Because the bar40. F. LEARY DAVIS, Demographic, Economic and Structural Factors, THE
GRAYLYN CONFERENCE 26 (1988) (on file with The North Carolina State Bar).
41. See figure 9 infra p. 168.
42. Kenneth Rutman, Salaries HoldingSteady, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 27, 1993 at
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gaining power of their customers was great, in large part because
of threats of new entrants and substitute providers, law firms
found great resistance to increases in their hourly rates. They
were caught in a classic "profit squeeze" .
VI.

FLUCTUATIONS IN THE PROFESSION DURING RE-ENTRY TO

THE BUYER'S MARKET: THE THREE WAVES

Lawyers' adjustments to the buyer's market can be observed
to unfold incrementally in three stages, or waves. Today, most
firms may be found at different stages in the adjustment process.
The three stages are:
1. Attempts to capitalize on aspects of hourly rate cultures by
paying close attention to elements of the NIPP formula as
the buyer's market evolves
2. Attempts to change billing systems to capture premiums
for added value while retaining cost-based protection, and
3. Changing the culture of law practice to be compatible with
a buyer's market and with the traditions of the legal
profession.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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In hindsight, it can be seen that the stages have unfolded naturally, like a series of experiments. Each was built upon the lessons of experience learned in the stages that preceded it. Law
firms kept what worked, discarded or modified what was not
working, and tried new strategies and tactics.
A.

The First Wave: Incremental Tactical Adjustments to the
NIPP Formula

The profession's initial adjustments to the evolving buyer's
market did not address fundamental problems inherent in hourly
billing. The change to a buyer's market was so gradual that it was
difficult to perceive. Periodic recessions made it difficult to distinguish a basic transformation of the market from temporary disturbances of the economy. Consequently, it did not appear that the
system of hourly billing was broken. Even today, in the absence of
longitudinal FIRE and GNP/attorney population data, it might
appear that problems of lawyers who bill by the hour will end with

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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the beginning of a robust recovery from the last recession.4 3 Since
it did not appear that the system was broken, there was no need to
fix the system itself. However, lawyers did find it necessary to
modify behavior to minimize the profit squeeze.
The primary tool with which firms addressed the profit
squeeze was STRATEGIC PLANNING, the formulation of goals that
flowed from the matching of firms' internal strengths and weaknesses against opportunities and threats in the exterial environment. However, to the extent that the firms doing the planning
continued to sell time, their plans were more tactical than strategic. These firms continued to view the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats they confronted within the context of
the NIPP formula. The First Wave tactics they adopted can best
be categorized within the same context.
i. Increased Marketing
The two crucial elements in the NIPP formula are LEVERAGE

and

UTILIZATION

(hours worked). As professionals selling their

own time, it was important that lawyers have clients for whom
they could work, and that they spend considerable hours doing
that work. As capitalists selling the time of others, it was important that partners have available other timekeepers whose fixed
expenses were less than the income generated from the sale of
their time. It was natural, then, that firms' strategic plans began
to focus on MARKETING and upon the efficient utilization of their
personnel.
ii.

Lateral Hires Instead of Mergers

With respect to UTILIZATION, firms asked themselves what
they could do to get their billable hours up. One solution was to
change strategies with respect to the acquisition of new partners.
Mergers flourished in the seller's market when firms had more
work than they could do. These busy firms needed the excess
capacity of less busy firms. In the buyer's market, many firms had
too little rather than too much work. They began looking for the
individual lawyer who could bring to the firm a portfolio of clients
to whose work they could allocate their excess capacity. So the
strategy of "CHERRY PICKING", acquiring the most attractive indi43. Nancy Zeldis, Law Firm Recruiting Picks Up, THE NAT'L L. J., Feb. 21,
1994, at 1.
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vidual lawyers from another firm, replaced the strategy of merging with the entire firm.
iii. Modified Compensation Systems
Since firms wanted to motivate lawyers to bill lots of hours
and to bring in work for which other lawyers could bill lots of
hours, they replaced their lock-step and fixed percentage partner
compensation plans with plans that rewarded lawyers for origination and production of work. These "Os AND Ps" COMPENSATION
PLANS were based on formulas that rewarded lawyers for originating new work and for producing billable hours by working on
cases. Firms are driven by their compensation plans, and firm
cultures began to change to reflect their new compensation systems. Firms that rewarded origination more than production
found their lawyers more interested in getting work than doing it,
and vice versa.
iv.

Short-term Focus on Billable Hours

Other individual and firm tactics to enhance utilization were

consistent with the new firm culture. MINIMUM BILLABLE HOUR
REQUIREMENTS for associates drove their utilization. They and
their partners desired that they SPECIALIZE EARLIER in their
careers. By training associates quickly in a narrow specialty and
immediately putting them to work in that specialty, partners
maximized their short- and intermediate-term utilization. LESS
TRAINING FOR ASSOCIATES

was a tactic that fitted well with a sec-

ond tactic: REQUIREMENTS OF MORE BILLABLE HOURS FROM PARTNERS. If the partners were going to be busier originating clients
and producing work themselves, they would not have time to train
associates. The fact that both partners and associates were focus-

ing on their billable hours meant

DECREASED PRO BONO WORK from

firms that billed by the hour. Associates and partners alike were
beginning to pay a great price for their financial compensation in
terms of DECREASED QUALITY OF LIFE.4 4
v.

Modifications to Enhance Leverage

During the seller's market, law firm growth was fueled by
high beginning salaries for associates. In the buyer's market,
44. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AT THE BREAKING PoINT (1991); N. C. Bar
Association, Final Report of the Quality of Life Survey of North Carolina

Attorneys (1991).
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firms had to ask themselves if they could continue to pay those
high salaries and the other overhead that accompanied them. The
concept of LEVERAGE in the NIPP formula began to be questioned
but not abandoned. Firms asked themselves what tactics they
could adopt to maintain a satisfactory ratio of associates or other
fixed overhead timekeepers from whom they got sufficient UTILIZATION to justify the entrepreneurial risks of the firm's equity partners. In the seller's market the tactic was merely to employ more
new associates as older associates became partners. In the
buyer's market, when fewer new associates were being hired, one
tactic to maintain leverage was to INCREASE THE NUMBER OF YEARS
IN THE PARTNERSHIP TRACK before promotion to partner. Another
was to initiate MULTIPLE-TIER PARTNERSHIPS. Salaried partners
could be leveraged as easily as could associates. Finally, satisfactory ratios could be created as easily by DECREASING THE NUMBER
OF PARTNERS as by increasing the number of associates. Many
firms expelled partners or encouraged them to retire earlier than
they formerly planned. CHERRY PICKING of partners with portfolios of business that could be performed by associates, of course,
could enhance a firm's leverage as well as its utilization.
vi. Billing Techniques
BILLING RATES are naturally the most difficult element of the
NIPP formula to adjust upward in a buyer's market. The utilization of BLENDED RATES, with the client's permission, allowed firms
to raise the rates of paralegals and junior lawyers in exchange for
a reduction of the normal hourly rates of senior partners to the
uniform blended rate. BILLING CONVENTIONS, such as the convention of not recording increments of less than .1 or .25 of an hour, or
that of recording the greater of the actual time spent or .2 of an
hour on each telephone call, do not have the effect of raising the
actual billing rate. In application, however, they raise the effective hourly rate. If agreed to -by the client, billing conventions are
an acceptable tactic. Without client consent, they are equivalent
to the padding of time. The most reasonable tactic was the adoption of DIFFERENTIATED RATES, in which a lawyer would charge a
low hourly rate for time spent on commodity work and a high
hourly rate for experiential work.
vii. Management Initiatives
Tactics adopted to improve REALIZATION address the issue of
how firms can collect for as much of the work they do as possible.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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These tactics, including IMPROVED TIMEKEEPING AND BILLING PROCEDURES, improved LETTERS OF ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT,
and appropriate UTILIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY, benefitted both
firms and their clients.
viii. Reducing Overhead
Finally, some tactics designed to improve the MARGIN were
counterproductive, making the firm less competitive in the buyer's
market. Others made sense, such as holding the line or decreasing starting salaries of associates. Most firms also had CLIENTS
PAY MORE OF THE OVERHEAD of their cases. They did this by passing on such expenses as telephone calls or photocopying to the client, or even by establishing profit centers within the firm for
activities such as photocopying.
B. The Second Wave: Attempts to Change the Method of Billing
Without Changing the Product
First wave tactics were helpful in eliminating inefficiencies in
practice, in motivating firms to articulate their goals, and in getting firms to focus more on their clients. However, because they
focused on the elements of the NIPP formula: leverage, utilization,
billing rates, realization, and margin, they could be of only limited
effectiveness in overcoming the profit squeeze in a buyer's market.
LEVERAGE had become unattractive because of the marginal profitability of associates resulting from their high salaries and the
scarcity of work for them to do. Even when work is available,
there exists a practical upper limit on UTILIZATION somewhere in
the neighborhood of 2,000 billable hours per year, and the pressure on that figure is downward because of increased management and marketing responsibilities of all lawyers in a buyer's
market. It is inherent that BILLING RATE increases meet price
resistance in a buyer's market, at least for commodity and brand
name services. One-time enhancements of REALIZATION can be
realized by better timekeeping and more prompt billing, but there
exist few ethical ways to realize more than 100% of one's time.4"
Finally, attempts to increase profit MARGIN by decreasing overhead are likely to be counterproductive, decreasing the firm's ability to deliver quality legal services in a timely manner.
45. Billing conventions agreed to in advance by clients, see supra text at p.
171, constitute one such way.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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The second wave was brief, stimulated by the realization that
the sale of time was no longer working for lawyers or their clients.
It involved the natural, incremental attempt to change the way
lawyers got paid without changing the way they practiced law.
Symbolic of the second wave was the concept of PREMIUM BILLING
(not vALUE billing, though that is what its proponents called it).
Essentially, large firm lawyers wanted to bargain in advance for
bonuses in the event they were able to obtain superior results,
which seems like value billing. However, the in-house counsel
who refused to contract with outside lawyers on that basis pointed
out that the outside lawyers were unwilling to reduce their fees if
they got inferior results. That refusal seems inconsistent with
value billing.
Hourly billing, blended rates, premium billing, and billing
conventions that produced unit fees for such events as telephone
calls were all cost-based billing methods. These methods assured
lawyers that they could pay their overhead and make a comfortable living if they had enough work to do. The second wave led to a
lot of thinking and talking about alternative billing methods, most
of it ably led by Richard Reed of Seattle.4 6 This discussion centered around the tendency of cost-based billing systems to reward
ineptitude and punish efficiency and innovation. It helped accelerate the swing of the pendulum back toward traditional valuebased fees (fixed, contingent, and percentage, if not retrospective).
As the pendulum swung lawyers found that clients who had
rejected pure premium billing were willing to accept hybrid billing
systems, which lay somewhere between cost-based and pure
value-based billing systems. Hybrid systems rewarded lawyers
for assuming the risk of absorbing uncompensated advance information costs or of obtaining an undesirable result. Examples of
hybrid systems include the true non-refundable retainer paid for
taking a case in which information costs have previously been
assumed, plus an hourly rate for work done subsequent to the
retainer. Another hybrid system includes the hourly rate plus a
fixed documentation, 47 research and development or systems fee.
The systems or documentation fee compensates the attorney for
46. See

BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING

METHODS (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989);

WIN-WIN BILLING STRATEGIES:

(Richard C. Reed ed., 1992).
47. Edna R. S. Alvarez, Value Billing - Five Approaches from Small-Firm
Practitioneers:FirstApproach, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 159 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989).
ALTERNATIVES THAT SATISFY YOUR CLIENTS AND YOU
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information and development costs previously incurred in designing a substantive system utilized to produce a standard document
in minimal time.
Finally, risk-sharing relationships were developed for hourly
rates plus contingencies that overcame the objections to pure premium billing. In exchange for a premium for very good results,
lawyers agreed to charge less than their normal hourly rates in
uncertain cases. In all of these instances, the lawyer in some
manner shares risks with the client. In the two-step methods
(documentation or systems fees followed by hourly rates), the lawyer shares the risk in advance by incurring information costs that
might never be recovered, but which might allow the lawyer to
meet future clients' needs in minimum time. In the hourly rate
plus contingency situation, the lawyer shares the risk of a bad
result by charging less than the normal hourly rate given the
work's position on the value curve. The market therefore limits
premium billing (a contingent fee added to a lawyer's normal
hourly rate) to situations in which the client's demand is for priceinsensitive unique or experiential services. Incremental Second
Wave thought and hybrid billing tactics prepared a foundation for
more dramatic Third Wave change.
C.

The Third Wave: Back to the Future by Reestablishing
Relationships with Clients and Forward by Creating
New Frameworksfor Practice
The First Wave provided focus and introduced realism to law
practice. It compelled lawyers to begin to think strategically,
though for the most part their strategic thinking remained confined within the framework of a billable hour structure. The
attempts of firms to modify their behavior in ways that maximized
elements of the NIPP formula were a series of incremental experiments in a complex environment. As such they allowed the profession to "muddle through"48 as it began to ascertain that it was
indeed entering a buyer's market.
The Second Wave caused lawyers to think about what they
did for clients, and how they charged them for those services. It
provided a prelude to a Third Wave which is still in its formative
stage. If the Second Wave was symbolized by an attempt at pre48. Charles Lindblom describes "muddling through" as an appropriate
method of planning for persons in complex environments who possess limited
information and intelligence. C. E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through,
19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 78 (1959).
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mium billing, the genesis of the Third Wave was symbolized by
the Total Quality Management movement, particularly its clientcenteredness and its call for changes in law firm culture. While
the Third Wave is informed by the pre-1960s buyer's market and
lawyering environment, its movement is relentlessly forward into
the next century.
Out of necessity that movement is likely to be accelerated by
innovation, "radical, discontinuous change". 49 The lawyer glut,
the expansion of technology and information, internationalization
of law practice, rising overhead, the tyranny of the timesheet, the
fragmentation of the bar, and the declining quality of professional
life provide powerful stimuli to creativity and change."0 The profession knows what it wants to move away from. As it defines
what it wants to move toward, the ultimate product of the Third
Wave may be a radically reengineered, if not reinvented, legal
profession.
The thinking of lawyers has evolved from a focus on their
needs in the First Wave, through a rethinking of what they do and
how they charge for it in the Second Wave, to a focus on the needs
of clients in the Third Wave. Clients insist on this focus. When
clients bargain for fixed, contingent, or percentage fees in a
buyer's market, they are quite explicit about what they are and
are not paying for. They are not paying for time, at least not in
the sense of billable hours, of minutes or multiples of minutes.
They desire certain events to occur, and they consider themselves
to be paying for those events.5 1 The events may be closings of
transactions or trials of cases, or they may be decisions - decisions that lead clients to pursue or refrain from certain courses of
action. Clients use lawyers to make these events happen because
they lack the requisite information and skills to make the events
happen by themselves, or if they possess the requisite knowledge
and skill, because it remains economically efficient to utilize
lawyers.

49. HARRY NYSTROM, CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 1 (1979).

50. Leary Davis, Lawyer Professionalism and the Seven Deadly Trends,
(forthcoming 1994) (copy on file with author).
51. Time may also be defined as some time management experts define it: as
a series of ordered events, so that in managing time we are really managing the
occurrence of a series of events. The concept of time as events is congruent with
Einstein's theory of relativity. See generally CHARLES R. HOBBS, TIME POWER

(Day-timers Concepts 1983) (recording with accompanying publication).
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Lawyers, then, help clients make and implement plans they
cannot make, or find it economically inefficient to make and
implement, by themselves. By thinking of lawyers' work in the
contexts of planning and leadership, one can develop frameworks
for reinvention of the profession. Leaders focus resources to create desirable opportunities. Leaders, lawyers and other planners
use seven categories of resources in making and implementing
plans. They are time, talent, commitment, capital, facilities,
information and positioning. 52 As clients make and implement
52. Some aspects of the seven categories of resources are self-evident but
nevertheless worth summarizing.
1. TIME. Time as a resource can be neither created nor destroyed. It
merely provides a context or frame within which one can cause a series of events
to occur. If it is not utilized for that purpose, the particular frame is gone forever.
Time cannot be transferred from one person to another, but by working on
projects together individuals can create large numbers of events as teams.
2. TALENT. Talent is the ability to do. It consists of knowledge and skill,
plus the personal attributes that allow one to translate one's knowledge and skill
into competent representation. Talent can be created. The more it is used, the
more it grows. If talent is not used it will atrophy.
3. COMMITMENT. Commitment is what causes people to use their talent.
Like talent, commitment must be utilized or it will disappear. But unlike talent,
even when commitment is utilized it will deteriorate if its utilization is not
reinforced at least intermittently by some positive response.
4. CASH AND OTHER CONSUMABLE OBJECTS. Cash can be traded for
other resources, or wasted. Either way, once it is used, it is gone, just as are
stationery, envelopes and other consumable supplies for which cash might be
exchanged.
5. FACILITIES AND OTHER NON-CONSUMABLE OBJECTS. To
implement plans, one needs housing and hardware. If a firm aggregates
individuals to build resources of time and talent, the firm must house them and
have equipment with which they can work.
6. INFORMATION. Information used to be considered a subset of talent.
Today information can be separated easily from personality, whether on
computer disk, substantive system, or otherwise. Information can be leveraged.
If it is marshalled into a substantive or procedural system, it can cause a series
of events to occur in much less time than a talented individual without ordered
information can make them occur. Information other lawyers do not have is very
valuable, particularly in the form of a system. Information tends to become less
valuable as others acquire and systematize it.
7. POSITIONING. Positioning is other peoples' perception of what one can
do, not necessarily what one can in fact do. Creating this perception has a lot to
do with trustworthiness and with integrity, the idea that one will do what one
says one will do, and that if for any reason one is unable to do what one says, one
will inform others so that they may protect themselves. Positioning relates to
the ability of lawyers in firms to approach, to be listened to, and to be believed by
other lawyers, judges, potential witnesses, and the parties to proceedings and
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their plans, they are most concerned about the timeliness and the
quality of the events that lawyers help them facilitate. So value is
a function of time and quality in the delivery of legal services. In
any representation of clients' plans we can expect time to be
inversely proportional and quality to be directly proportional to
the quantity of the six planning resources other than time and to
the harmony of their interplay.
The concept can be illustrated by depicting the resource of
time as a frame in which the other resources are displayed:
TIME
CAPITAL
FACILITIES

TALENT
COMMITMENT

INFORMATION
POSITIONING

The more of the other resources a firm possesses and the better
coordinated their utilization, the smaller the time frame required
for the firm's lawyers to cause events to occur for clients.
Readily apparent characteristics of the seven resources are
narrated in footnote 52, supra. It is useful to think about other
aspects of their interplay. For instance, while specialized information is the resource around which the profession is built, information in the sense of raw data is not valuable in itself. It is the
processing of information that makes it valuable. Both the speed
and the quality of information processing within a firm are dependent upon the firm's facilities and the talent of its personnel.
They are what translate information into decision-events. The
conversion of information into work products will allow lawyers to
remain both professionals and capitalists even if their ability to
leverage associate's time disappears. As capitalists and as professionals, lawyers should remain aware that information loses value
as it becomes readily available in the marketplace, that information-based experiential services can quickly become commodity
services, and that the continuous creation of new information is
necessary to retain positioning on the value curve.
The importance of positioning cannot be overemphasized. It
is what motivates clients to come to lawyers for the differentiated
and more expensive legal services that fall into the experiential
and unique categories on the value curve. As the perception of
others, positioning represents what people think a lawyer will do
transactions. Leary Davis, The Elements of Lawyer Competence: Their Nature,
Acquisition, and Utilization, (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript on file with
author).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

31

178

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:147

based upon pre-conceived ideas before the lawyer is retained. But
thereafter the perception of the client is informed by experience.
There exists a feedback loop between talent and positioning, and
the perception of clients will be strengthened or weakened
depending upon the lawyer's application of talent both in the rendering of legal services and in communicating with the client
about the representation. In turn, the utilization of talent for
those ends will depend upon the lawyer's commitment and the
information and information-processing facilities available to the
lawyer.
Commitment is the resource that is most imperiled in a billable hour culture that encourages lawyers to work physically taxing hours to meet unreasonable billable hour goals. At one level
the billable hour culture is adverse to commitment to the goals of
the client; it penalizes efficiency. The less time a lawyer takes to
cause events for the client within the culture, the less money the
lawyer makes. At a second level the billable hour culture encourages and even rewards overcommitment. Firms need many clients and cases to be assured their lawyers can work and charge
for long hours. Yet the overcommitted lawyer becomes committed
to no one. No single client is able to access the talent of the
overcommitted lawyer, except at the expense of other clients.
Information that would ordinarily be accessible to the lawyer
becomes inaccessible because of cognitive distress and competing
demands and distractions. The brief period of relaxation that falls
between the incubation and illumination phases of the creative
process is unavailable to the lawyer when the truly creative solution is needed by the client. Finally, if lawyers are overcommitted
they cannot do for clients what they have said they will do; as a
result they lose their trustworthiness and their positioning.
Because of the interrelationships of planning resources, focusing them to create desirable opportunities is often complex. These
interrelationships may be most readily apparent in small and
mid-sized firms. Such firms certainly find it easier than do
megafirms quickly to focus resources to solve problems and take
advantage of opportunities. It is in these firms that we should
expect to observe the first of the Third Wave innovations.
D. Examples of Leadership in Law Firms
R. Steve Bowden of the Greensboro firm of Bowden and Associates has reinvented the practice of law for himself, his staff and
his clients. He describes a reengineering of his plaintiffs personal
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1
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injury practice that allows his firm to deliver higher quality services faster through the leveraging of information and the organization and development of firm talent through training and
teambuilding. 53 Improved performance and communication with
clients and other decision-makers has enhanced his positioning.
Key to the firm's success have been two strategies that run
counter to the current industry and law firm tactics of specialization and downsizing. With respect to specialization, Carlyn Bowden, the firm's administrator, has restructured the work of the
firm's non-lawyer personnel. Previously, each employee performed discrete, specialized tasks as cases proceeded through
stages of representation. Files moved from station to station
throughout the office. After restructuring, a single employee is
responsible for all aspects of a client's case, from opening of a file
to its closing. With respect to downsizing, she has also determined the number of cases each employee, and therefore the total
firm, should be able to handle comfortably. Whenever that
number is attained, the firm hires and trains a new employee.
This tactic ensures the firm's support staff will always have excess
capacity. As a member of a team which includes the client and the
responsible attorney, each employee has client contact and
assumes many routine client communication tasks previously performed by lawyers.5 4
The key to the success of the Bowden firm 55 is leadership, as
David Campbell defines it: "Actions that focus resources to create
desirable opportunities."5 6 (emphasis added) Since clients want
lawyers to make high quality, high value events occur for them
quickly, the key to success for law firms will be the resources they
possess. The key to the sound acquisition and deployment of those
resources is leadership. As the Bowden case demonstrates, the
53. R. Steve Bowden, Address at Continuing Legal Education Program, Law
Firm Leadership in a Buyer's Market: Serving Clients Professionally in a
Competitive Environment (Oct 1, 1993) (videotape on file at offices of the North
Carolina Bar Association).
54. From firm and client perspectives, performance of these tasks by lawyers
was usually suboptimal within the time frame of the resource matrix.
55. Bowden, as a personal injury plaintiffs lawyer, charges contingent fees
and is rewarded for increases in efficiency. The fact that most solutions to clients
problems are being generated by such lawyers is reminiscent of the six phases of
a project, hourly billing being a project: (1) enthusiasm, (2) disillusionment, (3)
panic, (4) the search for the guilty, (5) the punishment of the innocent, and (6)
praise and honor for the nonparticipants.
56. DAVID CAMPBELL, MANUAL FOR THE CAMPBELL LEADERSHIP INDEX 3 (1991).
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resource matrix can be a valuable tool in explaining and predicting the degree of a firm's relative success. 7 When lawyers set fees
retroactively, the matrix can serve as a guide in determining what
a fair retrospective fee will be. Just as cost-accounting provided a
valuable tool in justifying hourly rates to clients in a seller's market, in a buyer's market the matrix is a valuable tool in justifying
to clients in advance the value of fixed, contingent, percentage and
hybrid fees. In conjunction with other models relating to the
structure of work5" it can also be used as a device to test the reasonableness of hourly rates in a particular case.5 9
The matrix also provides a valuable supplementary planning
tool for lawyers. They need merely ask which resources of time,
talent, commitment, information, positioning, capital and facilities they possess; which of them they need; and how they can best
acquire and utilize those resources in the service of clients.6 0 The
matrix leads to the asking of broad, general strategic questions. It
will not eliminate the need for something like the NIPP or other
algebraic formulas that report what happens quantitatively in law
firms. The resource matrix helps the firm develop a vision of the
resources the firm needs and of the goals for which it should
strive. The NIPP formula measures some ways resources are utilized in service of the firm's goals; it is a management tool.
But vision and management are only two tasks of leadership.
David Campbell lists seven,6 1 modified for law firmS 6 2 as follows:
* Vision, to clarify the general overall goals of the firm, determining where it is going.
" Management, to focus resources on these goals.
57. Bowden ordered information differently within the firm, acquired
facilities and trained new talent to process that information, ensured
commitment, and enhanced positioning by communicating with clients as team
members, then performing well in less time.
58. E.g., the Vroom-Yetton decision making model. VICTOR VROOM & PHILIP
YETrON, LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING (1973).
59. The matrix was initially designed to illustrate that fees charged by
counsel for the debtor in possession in a bankruptcy reorganization were
reasonable. F. Leary Davis, Justifying the Hourly Rate, or What Lawyers Sell
Instead of Time, 1990 Eastern Bankruptcy Institute L-1.
60. Every valid planning process has a resource analysis phase. Leary Davis,
The Elements of Lawyer Competence: Their Nature, Acquisition and Utilization
(forthcoming 1994) (manuscript on file with author).
61.

DAVID

CAMPBELL, MANUAL

FOR THE CAMPBELL

LEADERSHIP INDEX

4-9

(1991).
62. F. Leary Davis, Leadership in Law Firms: Seven Crucial, Constant,
Continuing Tasks, LAw PRACTICE MANAGEMENT, December 1993, at 43.
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" Empowerment, to select and develop team members able and
committed to achieving these goals.
" Politics, to forge coalitions with peers, superiors, subordinates
and important outside decision makers.
" Feedback, to listen carefully to clients and other relevant persons and publics.
" Entrepreneurship, to find future opportunities for the firm.
" Personal Style, by personal example, to set an overall tone of
integrity, competence and optimism for the firm.
The 30-lawyer Raleigh firm of Smith, Debnam, Hibbert &
Pahl brought into play each of the seven tasks in a situation
described by managing partner Thurston Debnam. 6 3 The firm has
a substantial commercial collection practice. During the seller's
market it had focused resources of information, facilities, talent
and commitment to resolve clients' collection efforts quickly and
successfully, utilizing substantive systems and charging percentage fees. In the process it developed software now utilized by the
Commercial Law League and law firms across the United States.
During the recent recession many of its clients began downsizing.
After downsizing, some clients had too few employees to analyze
adequately accounts and forward them to law firms for collection.
The firm subsequently lost a stream of income. So did the clients.
Because they failed to collect the accounts they were previously
able to forward, they had to downsize further, and a vicious cycle
began. The firm broke the cycle by suggesting that it send its personnel to the clients' offices to analyze accounts for them. The
firm's fee for performing the formerly in-house tasks of their clients was an additional percentage of accounts collected. This winwin situation resulted in larger fees for the firm and added value
to the client.
E.

Creativity in Law Practice

Herbert A. Simon has stated that problem solving can be considered creative under any of the following conditions:
1. The product of the thinking has novelty and value (either for
the thinker or for his culture).
2. The thinking is unconventional, in the sense that it requires
modification or rejection of previously accepted ideas.
63. W. Thurston Debnam, Jr., Continuing Legal Education manuscript
Attacking the Tyranny of the Billable Hour, LAw FIRM LEADERSHIP IN A BUYER'S
MARKET:

SERVING CLIENTS PROFESSIONALLY IN A COMPETITIVE

ENVIRONMENT

(Oct. 1, 1993) (available from the North Carolina Bar Association).
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3. The thinking requires high motivation and persistence, taking
place either over a considerable span of time (continuously or
intermittently) or at high intensity.
4. The problem as initially posed was vague and ill-defined, so
64
that part of the task was to formulate the problem itself.
The Bowden initiatives were creative, particularly under the
first and second conditions, and the Smith, Debnam initiative
under the first and fourth.
Leaders find opportunities in the unusual, and much of their
creativity will be found in their ability to redefine problems, to
"think outside the box",65 or solve seemingly intractable problems
by approaching them in a different manner, free of the limitations
we tend unconsciously to impose upon ourselves in defining
problems.
As the Smith, Debnam case suggests, downsizing in other
industries may create client needs that can be met by the creation
and delivery of services not previously rendered by law firms, if
law firms are willing to rethink what they do and how they do it.
Downsized companies can be expected to look to the open market
for services previously organized in-house. Data from the 40 years
prior to 1990 would lead market observers to believe that the 40year average ratio of 9.48 FIRE employees per attorney is a reasonable measure of the need for lawyers and may be utilized to
measure lawyer surpluses and shortages over time, as illustrated
by Figure 10.
But data for the last four years challenge that assumption, or
at least show something unusual when plotted in Figure 11. FIRE
employment in the United States actually decreased from 1989 to
1993. Figure 1 indicates that the finance, insurance and real
64. Herbert A. Simon et al., The Process of Creative Thinking (1962) in
A. SIMON, MODELS OF THOUGHT 144, 145 (1979).
65. The term "thinking outside the box" is derived from the problem of how to
connect a three-by-three array of nine dots which form a square box with only
four straight lines. Most people find the problem difficult to solve because they
restrict the drawing of their lines within the perimeter of the box formed by the
array of dots. The problem is easy to solve once they "think outside the box" and
extend their lines beyond its perimeter. For discussions of the problem see
WAYNE A. WICKELGREN, How TO SOLVE PROBLEMS: ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF
PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM SOLVING, 63-64 (1974); James L. Adams, CONCEPTUAL
BLOCKBUSTING, 16-17 (1974), appearing in Louis M. BROWN & EDWARD A.
DAUER, PLANNING By LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL
LEGAL
PROCESS, 291-295 (1978); F. Leary Davis, The Elements of Lawyer Competence:
Their Nature, Acquisition and Utilization (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript on file
with author).
HERBERT
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FIG. 10: SHORTAGES AND SURPLUSES OF LAWYERS IN THE UNITED
STATES BASED ON 9.5 FIRE EMPLOYEES PER LAWYER: 1950-1989
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estate industries might have down-sized so drastically that they
have created markets for substitute services from law firms. Lawyers must ask what the resulting departures from the normal supply curve in the 1990s mean. They could indicate a gross
oversupply of lawyers. They could signal a dramatic and permanent transformation of FIRE industries, or a less dramatic adjustment that creates a need for downsized companies to purchase
previously in-house services in the open market, perhaps from
lawyers. If the latter, law firms must ask further whether they
desire to provide the new services.6 6 Their provision might be
innovative, a break with the past, the creation of new professional
services and markets. If the data signify a more basic transformation, creativity'and innovation will be in even greater demand.

66. Many of these services may be outside conceptions of the traditional
practice of law and in the realm of "ancillary business", such as management
consulting services. At its 1994 mid-year meeting the American Bar Association
amended its Model Rules of Professional Conduct to allow law firms to offer such
services. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7 (1994).
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FIG. 11: SHORTAGES AND SURPLUSES OF LAWYERS IN THE UNITED
STATES BASED ON 9.5 FIRE EMPLOYEES PER LAWYER: 1950-1993
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Even in the absence of the need for innovation that is the
equivalent of "radical, discontinuous change"6 7 in the buyer's market, leadership will still be needed to focus resources to create
desirable opportunities for lawyers and their clients. The lessons
of experience of the pre-1960s buyer's market, the seller's market
of the '60s and '70s, and today's buyer's market suggest prudent
initiatives for all lawyers.
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW FIRM LEADERS AS THE THIRD
WAVE CRESTS

The emphasis of law firms in today's buyer's market is on
delivering legal services faster, better, and less expensively. Utilization, realization and profit margin remain important concepts
in the buyer's market. But the idea of LEVERAGING is being
replaced by the concept of TEAMWORK, and hourly BILLING RATES
are being replaced by FIXED FEES for services of determinable
value. The key to financial success will not be to cause the maximum number of hours to be worked, but rather to cause the maxi67.

NYSTROM,

supra note 2, at 1.
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mum number of valuable events to happen for clients in the
minimum amount of time. In that regard, I offer the following
suggestions.
A.

Recognize We'll Be in a Buyer's Market Indefinitely

Assuming lawyers remain in a buyer's market, they can anticipate doing most of their work in the future for fixed and other
traditional value-based fees. When the need for new kinds of services for corporate clients arises and a value has not been established for those services, anticipate that in-house counsel will
want the work done for an hourly fee. However, after the results
and fees of various firms performing the service have been monitored and analyzed, in-house counsel will be able to determine an
appropriate fixed fee for the work and will thereafter bargain for
that fixed fee, particularly for commodity or brand name services.
Lawyers should position their firms to render high quality fixed
fee services in a timely manner.
B.

Plan PersonalFinances Conservatively

Lawyers' personal financial planning should also be consistent with a buyer's market for our profession, i.e., conservative
and responsible. People who decide to enter the profession should
not do so because they expect to make a lot of money. Like those
who entered the profession during the last buyer's market, they
should go to law school because other aspects of lawyers' lifestyles
are pleasing to them: interesting and important work, opportunities for leadership roles, and the ability to make a difference in the
lives and institutions of other people. Should they then experience years in practice that exceed their financial expectations,
they should not adjust their standards of living based on the
assumption that all subsequent years will be equally profitable.
C.

Handle Business Aspects of the Profession in a Business-like
Manner

Lawyers should retain the realism about practice gained in
the First Wave of the buyer's market. Even though lawyers may
be doing primarily fixed fee work, they should continue to record
fee-producing time for cost accounting purposes. Likewise, they
should account for non-billable time to determine how it can best
be utilized to create potential value for clients.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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Change Firm Culture

Firm cultures should be consistent with a buyer's market: client-centered. Lawyers should attempt to make quality things
happen for clients as quickly as possible, preserving or adding
value to clients' enterprises. Lawyers should visualize themselves
charging a PRICE for creating events valuable to clients, rather
than a FEE, which clients may perceive not as something that adds
value, but as an added cost of doing business.6 8 When appropriate, lawyers should share risks with clients.
Changing firm culture sh6uld be deliberate, a planned action.
Plans for the firm should establish client-centered goals. Total
planning for the firm should include development of annual and
shorter term individual development plans for firm personnel that
are consistent with overall firm goals. As a part of their new cultures, firms should adopt compensation plans consistent with firm
goals, including plans for realistic (i.e., often lower) first-year
associate compensation.
E.

Improve Delivery of Legal Services

Law firms' plans should call for improved delivery of legal
services. The firm should invest in research and development,
systematize its practice, utilize technology appropriately, and
enhance training and team approaches.
F.

Improve Communications With Clients

Lawyers should strive to continue to enhance their communication skills, particularly interviewing, counseling and presentation skills. They should achieve clarity of initial understandings
with clients as to the scope of representation and fees for services.
Lawyers should prepare representation plans jointly with their
clients.
Lawyers should improve the billing processes of their firms,
being prompt and regular in their billing. They should not surprise a client with a bill, but should ensure that their billing practices are consistent with client expectations.
Lawyers should conduct client audits to get feedback on their
performance, and above all, return their telephone calls.
68. Milton W. Zwicker, Value-Added PricingofLegal Services, in BEYOND THE
119 (Richard

BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS

C. Reed ed., 1989)
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G. Build Practices on Good Relationships With Clients
As lawyers establish or reestablish appropriate relationships
with their existing clients, they should move incrementally from
cost- to value-based billing methods. Nevertheless, they must
realize some clients (courts, general counsel, etc.) will desire
hourly billing in situations where they need to monitor lawyers'
activities. Lawyers should facilitate that monitoring, while continuing to bill promptly, often, and without surprises.
H. INNOVATE! and Use Resource Matrix and Value Curve
Lines of Reasoning to Justify What You Do and How You
Charge for It
Though lawyers will remain in an overall buyer's market for
some time, they may differentiate themselves by offering needed,
unique services. Until other lawyers begin to offer the same new
services, such lawyers will occupy a seller's market with respect to
at least part of their practices. In the Third Wave buyer's market,
innovation will require high motivation and persistence, the formulation or redefinition of vague and ill-defined problems, and
unconventional thinking, "outside the box", which has novelty and
value.69
VIII.

CONCLUSION

If lawyers are going back to the future, they should be happy
that they are returning to a time when mythology states the practice of law was more professionally, if not as financially,
rewarding. And they are going back to the future with tools
unavailable 40 years age. They can reinvent the profession, and
the futures of their clients and communities. The challenges, and
rewards, of law firm leadership are greater today than they have
ever been. With the appropriate utilization of the seven planning
resources lawyers have the potential to make more high quality
events occur for their clients in less time, and in the process of
creating value for clients, to nurture the justice values that
brought them to the profession in the first place.

69. See supra, notes 64 and 65 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
GNP in
1987
Billions
1276
1259
1307
1312
1426
1567
1634
1694
1683
1779
1816
1851
1840
1940
1983
2037
2143
2232
2358
2489
2633
2703
2816
2891
2892

Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

Number of
Lawyers
194745
197085
199425
201765
204111
221605
232619
241881
249839
255867
260849

1957
1958

265835
271307

1959
1960
1961

277290
285933
290263

1962
1963

294699
299241

1964
1965

303908
309316

1966
1967

315608
323333

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

332484
342770
355242
364461
373327
387086
405712

1975

424891

1976

444856

1977

466926

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

489545
511406
542205
564667
587192
608552

3129
3299
3282
3248
3412
3569
3739
3845
3823
3884
3796
3940

1984

630950

4175

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

655191
677075
697848
717595
725574
755694
777119
792554
810902

2976

4295
4414
4545
4726
4853

4896
4836
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A

Nr. FIRE
Employees

U.S.
Population

1675000
1728000
1800000
1828000
1888000
1956000
2035000
2111000
2200000
2298000
2389000
2438000
2481000
2549000
2628000
2688000
2754000
2830000
2911000
2977000
3058000
3185000
3337000
3512000
3645000
3772000
3908000
4046000
4148000
4165000
4271000
4467000
4724000
4975000
5160000
5298000
5341000
5468000
5689000
5955000
6283000
6547000
6649000
6724000
6709000
6646000
6571000
6587000

140686000
144083000
146730000
149304000
152271000
153982000
157553000
160184000
163026000
165931000
168903000
171984000
174882000
177830000
180671000
183691000
186538000
189242000
191889000
194303000
196560000
198712000
200706000
202677000
205052000
207661000
209896000
211909000
213854000
215973000
218035000
220239000
222585000
225055000
227722000
229958000
232192000
234321000
236370000
238492000
240680000
242836000
245057000
247343000
249924000
252688000
254922000
257592000

Total J.D.
Students
35000
42255
44862
44736
41575
36734
33333
31866
32357
33405
35238
36272
36686
35769
37715

38894
42009
46666
51079
56510
59236
61084
59498
64416
78018
91225
98042
101675
105708
111047
112401
113080
116150
117297
119501
120879
121791
121201
119847
118700
117813
117997
120694
124471
127261
129580

FIRE per
Lawyer
8.60
8.77
9.03
9.06
9.25
8.83
8.75
8.73
8.81
8.98
9.16
9.17
9.14
9.19
9.19
9.26
9.35
9.46
9.58
9.62
9.69
9.85
10.04
10.25
10.26
10.35
10.47
10.45
10.22
9.80
9.60
9.57
9.65
9.73
9.52
9.38
9.10
8.99
9.02
9.09
9.28
9.38
9.27
9.27
8.88
8.55
8.29
8.12

SOURCES: Employment, Hours, and Earnings; U.S., 1909-1990, vol. II, Bulletin 2370
March 1991, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Jennifer Gardner, Economist; U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of
Monthly Industry Employment Statistics
Statistical Abstract of the U.S.; 1992, 112th Edition, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census
The National Income and Product Accounts of the U.S. Vol. 1, 1929-1958. U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, (1993 publication).
Survey of Current Business, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Dec. 1992, Vol. 72, No. 12.
Campbell University IS'POL-SED:ABA Review of Legal Education in the U.S. (1992).
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APPENDIX
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RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOGNIZE WE'LL BE IN A BUYER'S MARKET INDEFINITELY

Anticipate and respond to needs of clients
" Transition from cost- to value-based billing methods
" Maintain reasonable expectations; be conservative and responsible in handling personal finances
"

HANDLE BUSINESS ASPECTS OF PROFESSION IN A BUSINESS-LIKE
MANNER

Continue keeping time for cost accounting purposes
" Keep non-billable time to determine how it can best be utilized
to create potential value for clients
"

CHANGE FIRM CULTURE

* Plan for the firm and establish client-centered goals
" Make quality things happen as quickly as possible
" Charge a price (a value) rather than a fee (a charge)
" Share risks when appropriate
" Develop annual, shorter and longer range individual development plans for firm personnel consistent with firm goals
" Adopt compensation plans consistent with firm goals, including
realistic associate compensation
IMPROVE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES

" Invest in research and development
" Systematize practice
* Utilize technology appropriately
" Enhance training and team approaches
IMPROVE COMMUNICATION WITH CLIENTS

Return phone calls
" Achieve clarity of initial understanding as to scope of representation and fees
* Prepare representation plan jointly with client
* Improve billing processes
* prompt
" regular
* no surprises
* Conduct client audits to get feedback
"
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BuiLD PRACTICE ON GOOD RELATIONSHIPS WITH CLIENTS

* Realize some clients (courts, general counsel) will desire hourly
billing: facilitate their monitoring; bill promptly, often, and
without surprises
* Move incrementally from cost- to value-based billing as establish appropriate relationships with clients
INNOVATE!

Be creative
* Exercise leadership
• Help clients grow the economy, creating needs for more lawyers
"

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/1

44

